Emergencies and Disorder in the European Empires After 1945 by Robert Holland

Author:Robert Holland [Holland, Robert]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Science, General
ISBN: 9781136297182
Google: AkIsBgAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 17136825
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 1994-04-01T00:00:00+00:00

Emergency in Morocco, 1950-56

Anthony Clayton

Are emergencies like wars, Great or Gulf, the result of basic misunderstandings, or more fundamental, irreconcilable differences? Algeria and Kenya provide clear examples of communication systems silted up. It seemed at the time of their respective uprisings that in both the differences were irreconcilable. In the case of Algeria this proved to be so. In the case of Kenya, however, Kenyatta, the ethos of harambee ('all pull together'), the British Conservative Party's 'winds of change', moderate settler leadership and a measure of land reform bridged the gaps to the satisfaction of most. One paradox of the Moroccan Emergency is that the communication systems were in full flow before the first tensions. And on the Moroccan side the spokesmen included not only the leaders of a nationalist political party, but the Sultan of Morocco himself, with all his political and religious authority — no hitherto little-known college graduate whom the colonial power was attempting to marginalize, nor a man with any profound animosity towards the colonial power. Nevertheless, in the run-up years, we see a dialogue of the deaf.

Why? One facet of the French position, in the immediate post-war years, is well known; even for a protectorate the French position remained absolute, a product of the French Roman Law, Roman Catholicism and a revolutionary 'philosophy'. More than ever, after 1940 and the later Second World War Anglo-American hegemony, the empire (after 1946 the French Union) remained centralist and unitary. It was from North Africa with North African troops that French recovery had commenced; Morocco, the territory of Lyautey, France's greatest proconsul, was its most prestigious imperial possession. The French protectorate administration, established by the Treaty of Fez in 1912, generally represented French colonial rule at its best, securing the cream of administrative and military talent. Nationalism was seen by some Frenchmen as American-inspired, scheming to replace French hegemony, and by others as part of a Soviet strategic threat to encircle West Europe. These great power and strategic perceptions counted for more than economic considerations. France as a whole profited little from her rule in Morocco in economic terms, though a number of private companies did. The settler colons with influential contacts in Paris were a more significant social link. So there was general French agreement that Morocco's future should be secured as a French client-state, its overall foreign and economic affairs under French tutelage, its redoubtable soldiers available for use by the metropole.

This attitude was complemented by the operation, less well-known, of the French political system. For historical reasons the legislature, in particular the Chambre, or lower house, was all-powerful. In a nation still divided by the legacy of the Revolution, a régime d'Assemblée with a weak executive appeared the only method of securing legitimacy and protecting the nation against the rule of one man or one party. The Vichy experience had served to underline this perception of caution. The structural weakness of a régime d'Assemblée government was compounded by the nature of French post-war politics. Electoral

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.